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NOTES
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND THE QUESTION OF
JUDICIAL CAPACITY
The use of scientific evidence to resolve legal disputes has a long
history;1 the history of problems associated with scientific evidence
is equally long.2 One of the most serious problems has been the
inability of lay factfinders to understand complex scientific and
technical evidence. If a factfinder lacks the ability to assess evi-
dence adequately or if the judicial system lacks the resources and
time to educate the factfinder, the judicial system fails to fulfill its
role as an arbiter of disputes. Moreover, a party's right to due pro-
cess of law may be violated if the factfinder cannot understand and
base a decision solely on the evidence.3
Scientific and technological developments have resulted in in-
creased use of scientific evidence in the courtroom. The factfinder
must understand scientific evidence in order to give the evidence
its proper weight. Increasingly, the factfinder must evaluate com-
plex scientific and technological data.4 Cases in which the validity
or reliability of the science or technology itself is at issue create
even greater problems because the factfinder must evaluate evi-
dence about which even experts may disagree.5 Faced with such
1. See, e.g., Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (1782) (the first case in which the parties
called their own expert witnesses); A Trial of Witches at Bury St. Edmonds, 6 Howell's
State Trials 687, 697 (1665) (perhaps the first use of an expert witness at trial) (cited in
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385 n.7, 391 A.2d 364, 370 n.7 (1978)).
2. See generally Foster, Expert Testimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Reme-
dies, 11 HARv. L. RE v. 169 (1897) (discussing the problem of confusion among lay factfinders
caused by expert witnesses reaching opposite conclusions).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22 & 41.
4. For example, human leukocyte antigen tissue typing tests might become a common
method of proving paternity in child support proceedings, see, e.g., Phillips v. Jackson, 615
P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), and microfiber analysis might be one way to link defendants with
crimes, see, e.g., Driskell v. State, 659 P.2d 343 (Okm. 1983).
5. For example, experts may disagree about the safety of a waste disposal site, see, e.g.,
Save Our Selves v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 430 So. 2d 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1983),
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uncertainty, the lay factfinder nevertheless must determine which
evidence is more credible.'
This Note examines the judicial capacity to understand scientific
evidence. After discussing the importance of scientific evidence as
a tool for resolving disputes, the Note analyzes proposed solutions
to the problem of understanding scientific evidence in light of the
relevant policy considerations embodied in the Anglo-American ju-
dicial system. After discussing the various proposals, the Note con-
cludes that the most feasible solution is the expanded use of ex-
isting trial and pretrial procedures.
THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Scientific evidence should assist the trier of fact in understand-
ing issues underlying a legal dispute.7 To decide whether the
proferred evidence will assist the trier of fact, most courts follow
the admissibility standard enunciated in Frye v. United States.8
The Frye rule requires that the scientific method underlying the
evidence have gained general acceptance within the relevant scien-
tific community. Because of the constant flux in scientific knowl-
edge, courts must apply this standard each time a party, offers
or the effectiveness of a drug such as laetrile, see, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 399 F.
Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd and remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), on re-
mand, 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd and remanded, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), on remand, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
937 (1980).
6. Although an essential task of the factfinder is to determine which evidence is more
credible, the task is more difficult when the outcome of a trial depends upon an evaluation
of evidence at the cutting edge of science.
7. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that expert testimony is admissible
"[if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R. Evm. 702.
8. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defendant offered into evidence the results of
a systolic blood pressure deception test, a forerunner of the polygraph. The trial court ex-
cluded the results. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed, stating that an admissible scientific principle or discovery "must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
at 1014. This standard has become the majority rule in state courts, and the controlling test
in federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975);
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368-69 (1978). See generally Imwinkelried,
Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 577, 577-78 (1984).
1984] THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL CAPACITY
novel scientific evidence.9 Determining a scientific method's gen-
eral acceptance, however, can be costly in terms of public and pri-
vate resources.
A growing number of courts and commentators,10 therefore,
favor a less restrictive admissibility standard that would admit
novel scientific evidence if it satisfies a traditional relevancy analy-
sis.1" Although general acceptance within the scientific community
does not affect admissibility under this standard, the extent of ac-
ceptance does affect the weight given to the evidence.1 2
The Problem of Cost
Judicial application of the relaxed admissibility standard for
novel scientific evidence would reduce substantially the cost of
presenting the evidence to the trier of fact. One party to a suit
often will not have the financial resources to present his own ex-
perts or to challenge the other party's use of expert evidence. Sci-
entific experts are expensive to retain.13 If one party has substan-
9. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 380, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978).
With particular regard to expert testimony based on the application of new
scientific techniques, it is recognized that prior to the admission of such testi-
mony, it must be established that the particular scientific method is itself rel-
able .... On occasion, the validity and reliability of a scientific technique may
be so broadly and generally accepted in the scientific community that a trial
court may take judicial notice of its reliability. Such is commonly the case to-
day with regard to ballistics tests, fingerprint identification, blood tests, and
the like.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980); Imwinkelried, A New
Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scien-
tific Evidence, 23 WM. & MNARY L. Rxv. 261 (1981); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defin-
ing a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REv. 879 (1982). For a more recent contri-
bution to the debate over the Frye rule, see Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984).
11. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying the tradi-
tional relevancy analysis to determine admissibility of spectrographic voice identification),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). For a comparison of the Frye rule and the less restrictive
relevancy standard, see Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some
Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Exclud-
ing Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619, 621-24 (1984).
12. See 583 F.2d at 1198-99.
13. Van Duizend & Saks, Scientific Evidence in Litigation: Problems, Hopes, Accommo-
dations and Frustrations, 7 STATE CT. J., Winter 1983, at 5, 7.
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tially greater resources than the other party, the presentation of
scientific evidence may favor the wealthier party.14 The wealthier
party can retain the best experts in the field and can present a
greater variety of scientific evidence. This ability to present better
experts may influence the weight given to the evidence. The rela-
tive resources of the parties also may affect the ability of the
factfinder to comprehend fully the relevant scientific and techno-
logical issues.15 Consequently, a party may forego a claim, accept
an unfair settlement, or acquiesce in an unfavorable plea bargain if
he is financially unable to retain his own experts. 6
The Problem of Undue Influence
Another problem associated with scientific evidence is the ability
of impressive scientific evidence to influence unduly the lay
factfinder.17 Seventy percent of the judges and lawyers surveyed in
a recent poll indicated that juries accord scientific evidence more
credibility than other evidence, and seventy-five percent believed
that judges find scientific evidence more credible.' s Although this
result is not inherently alarming, it indicates that scientific evi-
dence sometimes may receive unjustified weight. For example, if
the prosecution in a drug possession case introduced a laboratory
report stating that a white powdery substance was cocaine, the
jury undoubtedly would give this evidence substantial weight.
Based on a recent study, however, the weight that juries give to
laboratory reports may be unjustified. 9 This study of over 235 fo-
rensic laboratories throughout the United States found significant
margins of error in the forensic analysis conducted by the
14. Id. at 23. "When a severe imbalance of resources exists, the trier of fact has little hope
of being informed about the relevant scientific and technical issues." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7.
17. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979); cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 267 ("Scientific proof is far from
infallible.").
18. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 5-6 (1983)
(citing results of 0. SCHROEDER, THE FORENSIC SCIENCES IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
LEGAL STUDY CONCERNING iHE FORENSIC SCIENCES PERSONNEL (Forensic Sciences Founda-
tion, undated)).
19. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 268-69 (citing Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration Newsletter 5 (Sept. 1978)).
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laboratories. 20
The Problem of Comprehension
The use of scientific evidence in litigation creates special
,problems when lay factfinders are unable to comprehend complex
scientific and technological evidence. If the factfinder does not un-
derstand scientific evidence, the evidence may obscure key facts in
a cloud of confusing technical terms and jargon.
Understanding all relevant evidence is essential to the proper
resolution of disputes. As a matter of due process, therefore, courts
require the factfinder to "decide the facts in an informed and ca-
pable manner"21 and to understand and address rationally the is-
sues of the case.22 As society becomes more complex and techno-
logically oriented, the lay factfinder's ability to comprehend
scientific evidence becomes increasingly suspect. Today, almost all
scientific or professional disciplines provide scientific or technolog-
ical evidence in courts. 23 For example, product liability suits usu-
ally involve engineering questions, 24 personal injury suits often re-
20. Id.
21. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976). In Boise, a
securities fraud case involving difficult accounting questions, the court rejected a motion for
a jury trial. Id. at 105. Complex suits, such as Boise, test the jury's ability to comprehend
complicated economic, statistical, and financial problems, analogous to the problems
presented by scientific evidence.
22. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (court rejected
a request for a jury trial because the case, involving over 100,000 pages of evidence and
difficult accounting principles, was too complex for a jury), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
23. M. SAKs & R. VAN DuIzEND, supra note 18, at 8. Saks and Van Duizend list the fol-
lowing scientific and professional disciplines represented in courts: engineering, medicine,
chemistry, physics, toxicology, anthropology, statistics, economics, accounting, biology, doc-
ument examination, sociology, psychology, law, linguistics, ballistics, and weapon identifica-
tion. Id. The use of such experts is an important tool in the adjudicatory process because
the use of science and technology can reduce uncertainty about particular facts. Id. at 5. For
example, if a defendant is arrested in the vicinity of a homicide, a question might arise
whether he actually was at the scene of the crime or was simply in the general area by
chance. If scientific evidence such as fingerprint identification or fiber analysis could place
the defendant at the precise scene, then the likelihood of the defendant's guilt would in-
crease. Thus, to the extent that scientific evidence reduces uncertainty, it improves the deci-
sionmaking process. Scientific evidence, therefore, is valuable to the factfinder because it
facilitates the decisionmaking process.
24. See, e.g., Perkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 482 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. La. 1980) (mechani-
cal engineer and industrial engineer testified about the safety of a chainsaw that kicked
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quire medical testimony as well as actuarial testimony,25 and
physicians often testify in medical malpractice suits.2" A homicide
prosecution may involve testimony from a pathologist,27 a ballistics
expert,28 or a toxicologist;2 9 an arson case may require testimony
from a fire marshall,30 a forensic chemist,31 or a psychiatrist.32 As
these examples indicate, science and technology play an active role
in our judicial system.3 3 Expanding technology and society's desire
back and caused severe injuries); Hayes v. Pennsylvania Lawn Prods., 358 F. Supp. 644
(E.D. Penn. 1973) (chemical engineer and mechanical engineer testified concerning the
cause of a lawn mower accident).
25. See, e.g., Saleeby v. Kingsway Tankers, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (medi-
cal, actuarial, and economic experts testified about injuries and amount of damages based
on life expectancy and future wages); Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 527 F.
Supp. 1021 (D.S.C. 1981) (medical, actuarial, and economic experts testified concerning
cause of death, potential life expectancy, and future earnings in a personal injury suit aris-
ing out of a boating accident).
26. See, e.g., Swanson v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Idaho 1983) (medical and
financial experts testified about proper medical standard of care and extent of economic loss
in malpractice suit for failure to diagnose a brain tumor); Green v. United States, 530 F.
Supp. 633 (E.D. Wisc. 1982) (medical experts testified about proper medical standard of
care and economic experts testified about extent of the economic loss in malpractice suit
based on negligent performance of coronary bypass operation).
27. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 435 So. 2d 772 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (forensic pathologist
testified about cause of defendant's son's death); Portis v. State, 418 So. 2d 924 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982) (forensic pathologist testified about the cause of death).
28. Cf. Patler v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 376, 378 (E.D. Va. 1973) (ballistics test used to
connect defendant with ambush murder), af'd, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974).
29. See, e.g., People v. Acosta, 620 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (toxicologist testified
about alcoholic content of defendant's blood in a vehicular homicide case); State v. Malzac,
309 Minn. 300, 307, 244 N.W.2d 258, 262 (1976) (toxicologist testified that despite defend-
ant's high blood alcohol level, the defendant could understand his actions when he killed his
girlfriend).
30. See, e.g., Manigan v. State, 402 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Ala. Crim. App.) (fire marshall
testified about cause of fire in a first-degree arson case), cert. denied, 402 So. 2d 1072 (1981);
State v. Rogers, 375 So. 2d 1304, 1311 (La. 1979) (fire marshall testified in arson case in
which fire chief and other firemen set fire to a fire station).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Hepp, 656 F.2d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 1981) (forensic chemist
testified about cause of an explosion).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 946, 952-53 (D.D.C. 1981) (clinical and
research psychologist testified in arson case about voluntariness of defendant's confession).
33. Participants in the judicial system favor using scientific evidence. In a 1974 survey of
judges and lawyers, 86% of the respondents favored the increased use of scientific evidence
in criminal cases. See supra note 18. Lawyers favor increased use because scientific evidence
receives greater weight than other types of evidence. See id. and accompanying text. Judges
favor the increased use because scientific evidence reduces uncertainty and helps ensure
more accurate results. See supra note 23.
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to incorporate that technology into the adjudicatory process, how-
ever, create a serious comprehension problem for the lay factfinder
and concomitant problems for the judicial system.34
Comprehension by the Jury
The jury system became a stable institution in England around
the thirteenth century.s5 Initially, the jury consisted of individuals
with special knowledge of the facts or subject matter involved."
During the middle of the fourteenth century, the jury evolved into
a group of impartial arbiters; 7 individuals with direct or special
knowledge assumed the role of witnesses. This shift represented a
commitment to using laymen in the administration of justice. 8
Under the earlier jury sytem, scientific evidence would not have
created the current problems of comprehension because a jury
composed of individuals with direct or specialized knowledge prob-
ably would possess the ability to comprehend the evidence. If a
case involving the safety of a toxic waste disposal site were tried
under the pre-fourteenth century system, for example, the jury
might include a toxicologist, a geologist, and others with special-
ized knowledge of toxic wastes. Such a jury would have a greater
facility for understanding the evidence. Today, the use of jurors
with direct or specialized knowledge rarely occurs, however, be-
cause of two important principles in the Anglo-American jury sys-
tem: impartiality and the adversarial system.
The modern Anglo-American jury system rests on the principle
that jurors determine the facts based on the evidence presented at
trial, and not on preconceived knowledge of the facts or subject
matter.3 9 A factfinder with special knowledge of the subject matter
34. See Cooney, Taking the Stand: Rising Use of Expert Witnesses Creates Controversy,
Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 1. The increasing use of scientific evidence is due to the
continued development of science and technology, which creates new ways to answer old
questions. See M. SAKS & R. VAN DumZsND, supra note 18, at 5 (scientific evidence promotes
certainty in legal decisionmaking, but also is subject to extensive cross-examination).
35. See W. HoLDswoRTH, 1 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 316 (3d ed. 1922).
36. See id. at 317.
37. See id. at 319.
38. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AmimcAN JURY 3 (1966).
39. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Com-
plex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. Rxv. 111, 122-23 (1972) (adjudica-
tor must be impartial).
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might be affected by personal or professional biases that would
prevent impartial analysis of the evidence. For example, a scientist
who advocates a particular theory might not assess objectively evi-
dence based on conflicting theories. One commentator has sug-
gested that the lack of impartiality would "seriously undermine, if
not obliterate, both the rationale and the participatory aspects of
adjudication."4 Impartiality is a function of due process, and a
system that furthers bias and prejudice on the part of the
factfinder violates due process.41
The second principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that pre-
vents a factfinder with special knowledge from serving as a juror is
the adversary system.42 A juror with special knowledge is usually
dismissed for cause or through preemptory challenge during voir
dire because at least one of the parties perceives the professional
biases of the potential factfinder as a detriment to his case.43 The
adversarial nature of our judicial system, therefore, which seeks to
bring about a fair and just resolution of a particular dispute, often
results in the use of a factfinding body that is ignorant about the
subject matter involved in the dispute.
40. Id. at 122.
41. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)
("[A]ny tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased
but also must avoid even the appearance of bias."); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946) ("The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either
criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-
section of the community.").
42. Under the adversary system, each party presents evidence supporting his version of
the events; theoretically, the entire story is laid before the factfinder. The generally held
belief is that the adversarial system is the best means to achieve truth and certainty in
dispute resolution. See Gross, Adversaries, Juries, and Justice, 26 Loy. L. REv. 525, 543
(1980) ("If cases are being conducted by advocates on both sides ... there is every reason
to expect that all relevant questions will be raised at some time before the conclusion of the
evidence.") (quoting THE MORRIs REPORT 283 (1965)); Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth,
and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975)
("[P]roperly directed and purged of obvious abuses, the juxtaposition of two contrary per-
spectives, the impact of challenge and counter-proof, often disclose to a neutral intelligence
the most likely structure of Truth."). But see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 1031 (1975). Less reliable methods of dispute resolution include,
for example, trial by battle and trial by ordeal. See generally W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
35, at 299-312.
43. See generally R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SocIETY 29-46 (1980) (dis-
cussing the influence of demographic and social characterics on jury selection and
performance).
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The application of the principles of impartiality and the adver-
sarial system has raised questions concerning the ability of juries
to decide cases involving complicated scientific or technical is-
sues.44 Critics of the jury system suggest that, in cases involving
complex scientific questions, the jury should consist of particularly
knowledgeable people-the so-called "blue ribbon" jury.45 A spe-
cial jury would be better able to understand complex evidence. 46
The blue ribbon jury could not be used in criminal cases, however,
because the sixth amendment guarantees the defendant's right to
an impartial jury of his peers,'7 and scientists are not among the
peers of most defendants. Although blue ribbon juries could be
used in civil matters, jurors would not be impartial if they had a
predisposed professional bias concerning the subject matter of the
dispute.48
Proponents of the current system believe that the jury forms the
best tribunal for resolving complicated questions of fact.49 Lay ju-
rors bring a fresh perspective to each trial, which enables them to
avoid the typecasting that may occur when judges sit as
factfinders.50 Moreover, in a complicated case, no single juror
needs to retain all the evidence as long as other jurors recall all the
44. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, supra note 38, at 5. ("The jury trial at best is the apothe-
osis of the amateur. Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street,
selected in various ways, for their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity
for deciding controversies between persons?") (quoting Dean Griswold, 1962-1963 Harvard
Law School Dean's Report, at 506); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF Gum. A STUDy OF T
ENGLISH CIMmiNAL TRIAL 271 (3d ed. 1963) (footnote omitted) ("There is no guarantee that
members of a particular jury may not be quite unusually ignorant, credulous, slow-witted,
narrow-minded, biased or temperamental.").
45. See generally Baker, In Defense of the Blue Ribbon Jury, 35 IowA L. REv. 409 (1950)
(discussing arguments for and against special juries). Note, The Case for Special Juries in
Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980) (discussing the merits and possible
methods of selecting special juries in complex cases).
46. Blue ribbon juries would be similar to the prefourteenth century jury system. See
supra text accompanying note 36.
47. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
48. Blue ribbon juries would not be permitted in the federal system given the mandate of
the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, which requires that jurors be "selected at ran-
dom from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes." 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
49. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, supra note 38, at 8; Foster, supra note 2, at 185.
50. H. KALvEN & H. ZEisEL, supra note 38, at 8.
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evidence and can refresh each other's memory21
Although the present jury system may be preferable in most in-
stances, juries may not be competent to handle disputes involving
complex issues of scientific fact. Scientific evidence may present
the jury with problems of comprehension similar to those encoun-
tered in complex litigation. Chief Justice Burger and other com-
mentators have suggested that jury trials should be waived in com-
plex civil trials.5 2 In Ross v. Bernhard,53 the United States
Supreme Court indicated that the right to a jury trial in civil liti-
gation depends in part on the "practical abilities and limitations of
juries."" In civil suits, the right to a jury trial arguably should be
foreclosed if the technological and scientific evidence is beyond the
comprehension of the jury.5 5 The possibility of depriving a party of
the right to a jury trial in cases supposedly beyond the comprehen-
sion of the jury, however, raises serious seventh amendment ques-
tions.56 Additionally, determining which cases involve issues that
are beyond the comprehension of the jury is difficult.
Comprehension by the Trial Judge
The judge in a bench trial fulfills the same factflnding function
as the jury in a jury trial. The trial judge also must rule on the
admissibility of evidence and determine the applicable law.57 The
51. See id.
52. Burger Suggests Waiving Juries in Complex Civil Trials, Nat'l Law J., Aug. 13, 1979,
at 21, col. 1; Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70
F.R.D. 199, 208 (1976).
53. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
54. Id. at 538 n.10. Other factors affecting the right to a jury trial in civil suits include the
remedy sought and whether a right to a jury trial existed with respect to the particular
issues before the merger of law and equity. See infra note 56. See generally C. Jouma, CNiM
JuSTcIE AmD Tm JuRY 54-56 (1962).
55. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977), revd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig.,
420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
56. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. No right to a jury trial
exists in suits at equity. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
57. In bench trials, the judge often relaxes the rules of admissibility preferring an over-
inclusive, rather than under-inclusive approach, to admissibility. If the trial judge mistak-
enly admits evidence, the presumption arises that the judge can ignore the inadmissible
[Vol. 25:675
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trial judge generally has a more extensive education than the aver-
age juror. This additional education places the judge in a better
position than an average juror to evaluate evidence because the
judge's background has forced him to master unfamiliar concepts
and ideas. The judge's skills should enable him to comprehend
complex scientific evidence more easily than jurors who lack exten-
sive formal education.
A trial judge's educational advantage does not indicate, however,
that the judge necessarily possesses the technical skills necessary
to fully comprehend complex scientific evidence.5 8 Trial judges are
trained in law and rarely have a technical background."9 Accord-
ingly, the trial judge also may fail to fully comprehend complex
scientific evidence.
In addition to his more extensive formal education, however, a
trial judge may use several judicial tools to help him understand
unfamiliar evidence. A judge can call his own expert witnesses,60
ask witnesses questions,61 and consult outside sources for back-
ground information.6 2 The ability to question witnesses is espe-
cially helpful in a bench trial because the judge can eliminate con-
fusion and misunderstandings sua sponte. In contrast, the jury
must rely on the parties' attorneys to probe areas of confusion. Al-
though the ability to use special procedures gives the judge an ad-
vantage over the jury, this advantage has its costs: judicial time
evidence in making findings of fact and conclusions of law. Conversely, if a judge excludes
admissible evidence, he may have committed reversible error. See McCoRMCK'S HANDBOOK
OF Tm LAW OF EVIDENCE § 60 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmCK].
58. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("Substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by
technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable.... ."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("The court's opinion today centers on a substantive evaluation
of the Administrator's assumptions and methodology. I do not have the technical know-how
to agree or disagree with that evaluation.").
59. See supra note 58. See also Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through The Legal
Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817, 822-23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon, Coping];
Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 209, 209-11
(1981).
60. See, e.g., FED. R. Evn. 706. For a more detailed discussion of this option, see infra
notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
61. See State v. Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E.2d 24 (1968); McCozmcK, supra note 57,
§8.
62. See FED. R. EvD. 201.
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and energy. Additionally, the availability of these procedures does
not guarantee that a judge will understand the technical evidence
presented. Consequently, neither judges nor lay jurors are always
fully competent to evaluate complex scientific and technological
evidence.
The Problem of Judicial Administration
Using scientific evidence to resolve disputes often creates man-
ageability problems for the judicial system. 3 Court dockets are
overloaded, and many judges and commentators have complained
about the resulting delay.6 Scientific evidence that a jury compre-
hends readily should reduce trial time and delay. Conversely, if the
scientific evidence presented is not readily understandable, trial
time may increase due to efforts by the parties, the court, and the
jury to digest the evidence. The increased use of scientific evi-
dence, 5 the trend toward a more relaxed standard of admissibil-
ity,6 6 and the increasing number of suits involving science and
technology 67 will compound the problem of delay. Thus, scientific
evidence often creates additional burdens of manageability and
poses serious problems of judicial administration. 8
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Proposals for dealing with scientific evidence problems have ex-
isted almost as long as the problems themselves. Judges,69 law-
63. See In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976) ("The
explosion of litigation in the past two decades in terms both of number of filings and the
complexity and scope of many of those cases has led thoughtful minds to wonder whether
the judicial system as we now know it can cope with some of these cases."). See generally
Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much Of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96-104 (1976).
64. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); Burger,
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A. J. 295, 297 (1980). For a
statistical analysis of the federal district courts' caseloads, see Clark, Adjudication to Ad-
ministration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981). For a general discussion on proposed remedies, see Shetreet,
Remedies for Court Congestion and Delay: The Models and the Recent Trend, 17 U.W.
ONrAmuo L. Rav. 35 (1979).
65. See supra note 34.
66. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 34.
68. See Foster, supra note 2.
69. See Markey, Jurisprudence or "Juriscience'7, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 525, 539-42
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yers 7 0 scientists and expert witnesses 7 1 and scholars72 have pro-
posed solutions. A review of these proposals demonstrates the
strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches to scientific
evidence in the courtroom.
The Science Court Proposal
One author has proposed the creation of a Science Court to re-
solve the uncertainty and complexity surrounding scientific and
technological issues.7 In 1976, the Task Force of the Presidential
Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technol-
ogy also recommended the creation of a Science Court for the lim-
ited purpose of resolving scientific disputes hindering the adminis-
trative decisionmaking process. 4 Under the latter proposal, the
Science Court would operate much like a regular court, but would
adjudicate only technologically complex issues.7 5 Before the Sci-
ence Court considered an issue, the submitting agency would sepa-
rate fact issues from social policy considerations76 because the Sci-
ence Court would adjudicate only disputed questions of fact. The
court's findings of fact would be presumptively valid. 77 The admin-
istrative agency that submitted the issue then could rely on the
Science Court's findings in developing an appropriate policy based
on relevant value considerations.7 8
The Task Force Report set forth an elaborate set of procedures
that essentially involves five stages. The first stage involves separa-
tion of disputed facts from social policy considerations, and selec-
(1984) (proposing Rules of Technological Adjudication).
70. See, e.g., Campbell, A Historical Basis for Banning Juries, Natl L.J., Feb. 11, 1980,
at 17, col. 1 (proposing nonjury trials in complex civil suits).
71. See, e.g., Kantrowitz, Proposal For An Institution For Scientific Judgment, 153 SCL
763 (1967), reprinted in 113 CONG. REc. 15,256 (1967) (proposing the creation of a science
court for resolving scientific controversies in administrative decisionmaking).
72. See, e.g., M. SAKs & R. VAN DuizEND, supra note 18, at 91-101.
73. Kantrowitz, supra note 71.
74. Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science
and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report. 193 SCi. 653 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
75. Id. at 654.
76. Id. at 653.
77. Id. at 655.
78. See Matheny & Williams, Scientific Disputes and Adversary Procedures in Policy
Making: An Evaluation of the Science Court, 3 LAw & PoLicY Q. 341, 344 (1981).
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tion of the participants."' The Science Court would operate on the
assumption that the separation of facts and values is possible."0
The Science Court participants would be magistrates, judges, and
case managers."' The magistrate, a disinterested scientist from an
"adjacent" field of science, would control the court's procedure 2
and would have the assistance of legal counsel.88 The opposing par-
ties would select the judges from a list of eminent scientists. 4 The
judges and the magistrate, upon selection, would appoint a case
manager for each party,"5 who would present the different sides of
the scientific issues.8
The second stage of the procedure involves submission of a se-
ries of "statements of scientific facts" by the case managers to the
panel of judges.87 The judges would review the statements and
eliminate those statements not exclusively concerned with ques-
tions of scientific fact." After the judges had screened the state-
ments, the third stage of the procedure would allow the case man-
agers to examine and evaluate the statements of scientific fact.89
The case managers could challenge each other's statements, but
unchallenged statements would appear in the court's final report.90
Challenged statements would go through a mediation process to
further define the points of disagreement. 91 This stage is analogous
to the stipulation of facts in an ordinary lawsuit. The facts agreed
79. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 653-54.
80. Id. See also Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 Am. Sc. 505,
506-07 (1975).
81. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 654. See generally Matheny & Williams, supra
note 78, at 343-44.
82. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 654. No criteria have been suggested to define
an "adjacent" field of science. See Martin, Procedures for Decision Making Under Condi-
tions of Scientific Uncertainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443, 451
n.10 (1979) (expert should not be associated with the scientific specialty in question).
83. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 654.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. During the second stage, the judges would eliminate nonscientific questions of fact
and mixed questions of policy and fact. Id. at 653.
89. Id. at 654-55.
90. Id. at 655; see also Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 13 TmjA, Mar. 1977,
at 49.
91. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 655.
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upon by the parties would appear in the final opinion, but facts
not agreed upon would be considered in the fourth stage of the
procedure.92
In the fourth stage, challenged statements would be subject to
an adversarial examination to resolve remaining questions of fact.9"
The Science Court would use quasi-legal procedures to test each
side's version of the facts.9 Essentially, this stage would resemble
a trial in which each side presents its witnesses and cross-examines
witnesses called by the other side. Upon completion of the argu-
ments, the judges would resolve the remaining questions of fact.
The final stage of the Science Court procedure involves the pro-
duction of the judges' final report.95 The judges would submit a
final report to the governmental agency that initiated the proceed-
ings.96 The report would contain three parts: first, a statement con-
taining the unchallenged and unmodified statements of scientific
facts agreed upon by the parties;97 second, the judges' opinion con-
cerning the validity of the challenged statements based on evi-
dence presented during the adversary stage;98 and third, the court's
recommendation of areas needing further research because of ex-
isting limitations on scientific knowledge. 9
Proponents argue that the Science Court would provide a pre-
cise, organized structure for making accurate factual determina-
tions for administrative decisionmaking. The factual determina-
tions would reflect the best available scientific judgment on the
issues and would alleviate the burden placed on agencies and
courts to resolve disputed scientific and technical issues. 00 Propo-
nents believe this process holds great promise for supplying provi-
sional answers to essential technical questions that agencies must
resolve before determining social policy.'0 ' The proposal would al-
low experts to address conflicting arguments in a structured set-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Matheny & Williams, supra note 78, at 344.
97. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 655.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 653.
101. Id.
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ting, thereby promoting a complete and considered evaluation of
all arguments. 0 2
The Science Court would be a valuable institution for resolving
disputes over scientific facts because it would reduce uncertainty.
The Science Court would enable an administrative agency to es-
tablish policy based on the best available scientific evidence. As
science and technology advance, agencies could revise policy deci-
sions to reflect those changes. The Science Court's findings would
enable agencies to make difficult policy decisions without waiting
for absolute scientific certainty.103
The Science Court proposal has drawn much criticism.1 0 4 One
criticism concerns the ability of the court to separate questions of
fact from social policy considerations.0 5 Critics believe that differ-
entiating between facts and values is an inherently value-laden
process.108 Because separating facts and values is a central premise
of the Science Court proposal, if this separation is not attainable,
the entire process would fail.
Other critics fear that, after the Science Court had made a de-
termination of scientific fact, the fact would be surrounded by an
aura of authority that could stifle further research.10 7 This criti-
cism, however, is misplaced. The Task Force Report states that
one function of the Science Court's final report would be to iden-
tify areas needing further research.108 Furthermore, researchers sel-
dom are stifled by authoritative determinations of fact."'
Another criticism of the Science Court is that, after the findings
of fact, administrative consideration of social policy values, and
agency decision, dissatisfied parties may relitigate the issues in
102. Id.
103. See Bazelon, Coping, supra note 59, at 820.
104. See generally Casper, Technology Policy and Democracy: Is The Proposed Science
Court What We Need?, 194 ScI. 29 (1976); Matheny & Williams, supra note 78.
105. Casper, supra note 104, at 30.
106. Id.
107. Id. Matheny & Williams, supra note 78, at 349-52.
108. Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 655.
109. For example, although the United States Supreme Court made a legal determination
concerning the commencement of life in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), researchers con-
tinue to research the topic. See generally Comment, Homo Sapienism: Critique of Roe v.
Wade and Abortion, 39 ALB. L. REv. 856 (1975); Comment, Viability and Abortion, 64 Ky.
L.J. 146 (1975).
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court.110 The critics fear that value considerations might be subor-
dinated to the presumably valid facts. 11 Critics who stress this
possibility believe that the social policy values are the most impor-
tant consideration and that the benefits of greater certainty do not
justify subordination of values. 1 2
Any solution to the problem of comprehending scientific evi-
dence must be simple or the decisionmakers may ignore it. The
Science Court proposal, as outlined by the Task Force, would not
be easy to apply. Serious questions remain concerning appropriate
disputes for the Science Court to resolve,1 3 and parties might be
reluctant to submit disputes to an untested dispute resolution
system.
The Science Court's usefulness in solving the problems sur-
rounding the reliability of scientific evidence would be limited to
special cases."14 Although the proposal retains aspects of the adver-
sarial system and eliminates the system's reliance on lay
factfinders," 5 the use of factfinders with special knowledge also
would threaten the traditional values of our present adversarial
system. Impartiality might be endangered by using scientists to
make factual determinations. Even if the judges were screened for
possible bias resulting from their position in the scientific commu-
nity, they might carry personal and professional biases that could
influence their decisions. Finally, the use of scientists to make fac-
tual determinations is contrary to the general principles of the
American jury system and would be a major step toward the crea-
tion of a technocracy."'
110. See Matheny & Williams, supra note 78, at 347.
111. See Casper, supra note 104, at 30.
112. See id.
113. For example, the Science Court would be structured to deal with bipolar issues. The
procedure for dealing with multipolar issues, such as nuclear power, is not adequately ad-
dressed. Also, whether the Science Court would address all agency disputes or only disputes
with major policy implications is unclear. See Task Force Report, supra note 74, at 653-54.
114. The Science Court, as outlined by the Task Force, would deal only with scientific
disputes within governmental agencies. The Science Court, therefore, would be of limited
value in resolving scientific disputes arising in private litigation.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
116. See Markey, supra note 69, at 526, 534-36. Chief Judge Markey's term, "juriscience",
is similar in meaning to "technocracy." "Technocracy" and "juriscience" describe a society
or system guided by the principles of science and run by those with scientific or technical
expertise in contrast to a system governed by jurisprudential principles.
1984]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Educational Efforts to Improve Scientific and Technological Abil-
ities of the Factfinder
Some commentators have suggested that, in order to improve
the capacity of the courts to understand complex scientific and
technological evidence, the legal system should try to improve the
scientific and technological abilities of judges.117 This proposal sug-
gests that prospective judges should have a technical background
and that judges currently on the bench should undergo systematic
training in science and technology." 8 Commentators favoring this
proposal argue that special training would familarize the courts
with scientific methods and principles and greatly improve the ju-
diciary's capacity to understand scientific evidence.119
This proposal suffers from several drawbacks. First, education
would be expensive. Courts are overburdened with heavy case
loads, and this proposal would divert judicial resources from the
courtroom to the classroom. The result would be increased delay
and increased burdens on the courts. Second, experienced judges
might be reluctant to submit to the uncertainties and potential
embarrassments of the classroom. Third, a judge with limited sci-
entific training might not obtain adequate knowledge to decide an
issue that could be better explained by an expert.12 0 Finally, the
proposal is simplistic. Science is a vast area and judges, by neces-
sity, could learn only a limited amount about any one subject. Ad-
ditionally, this practice might set an unfortunate precedent. If
judges received special training in science and technology, then a
similar argument could be made for training in other complex
fields, such as accounting or economics.
Advisory Panels of Scientists and Lay Persons
Another proposed solution for improving the judicial compre-
hension of scientific evidence is the creation of advisory panels
117. See Jasonoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Compe-
tence, 68 A.B.A. J. 1094, 1098 (1982). But see Bazelon, Coping, supra note 59, at 828.
118. See Bazelon, Coping, supra note 59, at 828.
119. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 509, 546-54 (1974) (discussing the use of scientific experts as aides to the courts).
120. See Bazelon, Coping, supra note 59, at 828.
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consisting of lay persons and scientists.121 These panels, which
would be established by governmental agencies or by municipal
governments, would attempt to resolve difficult policy questions
containing disputed scientific facts. 122 Scientists would provide sci-
entific understanding of technical issues,1 23 and lay persons would
inject the "wisdom of the community" into the process to guard
against "scientific elitism. '124 Proponents of this approach believe
that advisory panels would possess the technical abilities and com-
mon sense to resolve questions of policy too important for a panel
of scientists and questions too complex for a panel of lay per-
sons. 1 25 After the panel had made the relevant factual determina-
tion, it would submit a recommendation to the authority that es-
tablished the panel.1 28 The authority then would make its policy
determination on the basis of the panel's recommendations. 27
One problem with advisory panels is the possibility that the
scientists could intimidate the lay members. 128 Although the
panel's lay members would bring common sense to the panel, the
expert members presumably would offer that quality as well as
technical expertise.1 29 This imbalance might prompt the lay mem-
bers to follow the experts, especially when the lay persons were
confused about technical matters.
Another criticism of advisory panels is the lack of an established
procedure for selecting panelists. Questions about the number of
scientists needed to ensure full treatment of all technical issues
and the number of lay persons needed to check scientific elitism
remain unanswered. As with the proposed Science Court, the lack
of an established procedure would make many litigants reluctant
to resolve disputes in this unprecedented system.130
121. See Martin, The Proposed "Science Court", 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1977).
122. See id. at 1067.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1068.
128. Id. at 1067.
129. Id.
130. Further criticisms of advisory panels involve the disproportionate role that scientists
would play, as well as their lack of accountability under an advisory system.
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Simplifying the Evidence
Some commentators have suggested altering the scientific evi-
dence, rather than changing the decisionmaking structure.' 1
Under this approach, technical and scientific evidence would be
simplified for the judge or jury." 2 If the evidence could not be
made comprehensible, the trial judge would have the discretion to
exclude it.' This proposal is an extension of the probative-versus-
prejudicial-impact balancing test of rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.3 4 The proposal would keep decisionmaking in the
hands of average citizens and forestall the development of a
technocracy.13 5
A simplified presentation of scientific evidence might ameliorate
the comprehension problems currently faced by judges and juries.
Excluding scientific evidence that is difficult to comprehend, how-
ever, ignores the benefits of such evidence.' e3 This proposal as-
sumes that the comprehension problem substantially outweighs
the benefits of scientific evidence and, therefore, sacrifices the ben-
efits to eliminate the problem. Parties usually attempt to explain
intelligibly all the evidence, but some cases involve scientific and
technological issues that cannot be simplified beyond a certain
level.'3 7 This approach fails to acknowledge the important role that
science and technology often play in dispute resolution.
Another shortcoming of this proposal is the inability of judges to
evaluate the ability of a jury to comprehend technical data.138
131. See, Markey, supra note 69, at 542; Van Duizend & Saks, supra note 13, at 27.
132. Van Duizend & Saks, supra note 13, at 27.
133. See id.
134. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
135. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
136. The potential benefits of scientific evidence relate to its probative value, relevance,
and capacity for reducing uncertainty. See supra note 23.
137. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547
F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (involving safety of a nuclear power plant), reu'd sub nom. Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 435 U.S. 519
(1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (securities fraud
case involving complicated accounting questions).
138. Section 1865 of Title 28 of the United States Code establishes the qualifications for
jury service:
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Judges might exclude evidence that the jury could have under-
stood, or might admit evidence' that the jury will fail to under-
stand. A judge concerned with avoiding confusion might exclude
relevant, probative, and comprehensible evidence.
Increased Use of Existing Judicial Tools
Some commentators have suggested that better use of existing
procedures could eliminate the problem of comprehending scien-
tific evidence. 139 These procedures include using special masters,140
advisory juries,141 and court-appointed experts.1 42 Additionally,
courts could use pretrial discovery conferences to narrow the con-
tested issues.148 Courts also have the inherent power to use flexible
trial techniques to better educate lay factfinders.1 "
(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the district court, or such
other district court judge as the plan may provide, shall deem any person qual-
ified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he-
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided
for a period of one year within the judicial district;
(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a de-
gree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification
form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfac-
tory jury service.
28. U.S.C. § 1865 (1982). This statute sets only minimum qualifications and does not give
the judge the necessary guidance to determine a juror's ability to understand complex, tech-
nical evidence.
139. See M. SAKs & R. VAN DutZam, supra note 18, at 96.
140. FaD. R. Civ. P. 53; see infra note 158.
141. FED. R. Crv. P. 39(c).
142. FED. R. Evm. 706; see infra note 171.
143. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) provides:
At any time after commencement of an action the court may direct the at-
torneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of
discovery....
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively
identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule
for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such
other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the
proper management of discovery in the action.
FEn. R. Crv. P. 26(M.
144. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (trial
judge did extensive reading and permitted a lecture by an expert to help the judge compre-
hend complex statistical and econometric data).
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The greatest problem with existing procedures is not misuse, but
nonuse.145 Commentators suggest that nonuse results from unfa-
miliarity with the procedures or from a judicial belief that the tools
are too cumbersome.14 Another problem with this proposal is the
lack of an incentive to encourage greater use of available proce-
dures. An incentive to use existing procedures might provide an
opportunity to study and evaluate their effectiveness. 47 One of the
existing procedures that merits consideration is the pretrial
conference.
Expanded Use of the Pretrial Conference
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides general
authority for establishing pretrial procedures. 14 Rule 16 authorizes
145. See Konopka, Applied Social Research as Evidence in Litigation, in M. SAKS & C.
BARON, THE USE/NoNusEIMIsusE OF APPLIED SocIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS 129, 134
(1980).
146. See M. SAu & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 18, at 66; Schwartz, Judicial Deflection
of Scientific Questions: Pushing Laetrile Towards Medical Closure, 13 N.M.L. REv. 119,
121 (1983).
147. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUZEND, supra note 18, at 96.
148. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
(a) PRETRIAL CONFERENCES; OB-ECTVES. In any action, the court may in its
discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes
as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough prepara-
tion, and;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT PRETRIAL CONFERENCES. The participants
at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the
elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecesssary proof, stipulations regarding the authen-
ticity of documents, and advance rulings from the court on the admissi-
bility of evidence;
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence;
(5) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need and
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courts to require that the parties to an action participate in a pre-
trial conference to facilitate the orderly administration of the
suit.149 Chief Judge Pollack has stated that the pretrial conference
"is a device to aid the efficient presentation of a case in order to
maximize the chances of a fair and just result."1 0 The purpose of
the pretrial conference is "to simplify the issues, obtain admissions
of fact, identify witnesses, delineate the factual and legal issues,
and set the stage for an efficient trial of the facts which remain in
dispute."151
The pretrial conference is the starting point in dealing with com-
plex scientific evidence.252 If a court is aware of potentially com-
schedule for filing and exchanging pretrial briefs, and the date or dates
for further conferences and for trial;
(6) the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master;,
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures
to resolve the dispute;
(8) the form and substance of the pretrial order;,
(9) the disposition of pending motions;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing poten-
tially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues,
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems;
and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 168-70 (1983).
Most states have adopted a pretrial conference rule or statute. See AL& R. Crv. P. 16;
Auz. R. Civ. P. 16; AR. R. CIv. P. 16; CAL. SUPER. CT. R. 206-221; COLO. R. Civ. P. 16;
CONN. Sup. CT. R. § 265; DEL. C.P. CT. Civ. R. 16; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200; ILL. Sup. CT. R. 218;
IND. TimA R. 16; IowA R. Civ. P. 136; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-216 (1976); Ky. R. CIv. P. 16;
LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. art. 1551 (West 1960); ME. R. Civ. P. 16; MD. R. PRoc. 504; MAss.
R. CIv. P. 16; MICH. CT. R. 301; MNN. R. Crv. P. 16; Mo. R. Civ. P. 62.01; NEv. R. CIV. P. 16;
N.H. SupER. CT. R. 59; N.J. Supan. CT. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:25; N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 16; N.C.
R. Civ. P. 16; N.D. R. CIv. P. 16; Omo R. Civ. P. 16; OxLA. DIsT. CT. 11 5; PA. R. CIv. P. 212;
R.L SupaR. CT. R. Civ. P. 16; S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15-6-16 (1967); TENN. R. Civ. P. 16;
UTAH R. CIv. P. 16; VT. R. Civ. P. 16; WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. 11. 16; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16;
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 802.11 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 16.
149. See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALn. L. REv. 770, 773 (1981).
150. Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 427, 451 (1970).
151. Dunagan & Ricketts, An Overview of Pre-Trial Preparation for Business Related
Litigation, 16 TuLSA L.J. 139, 177 (1980).
152. The 1983 amendments to Rule 16 codified existing local rules and encouraged the
scheduling and holding of a pretrial conference.
(b) SCHEDULING An PLANNINo. Except in categories of actions exempted by
district court rule as inappropriate, the judge, or a magistrate when authorized
by district court rule, shall, after consulting with the attorneys for the parties
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plex scientific evidence early in a dispute, the court will have a
greater opportunity to use the available procedures to facilitate the
court's understanding of the evidence. Using pretrial conferences
to improve the ability of the lay factfinder to understand scientific
evidence is a relatively easy solution to the comprehension prob-
lem because it does not involve learning new procedures, establish-
ing a new court, or enacting new statutes.
To ensure the appropriate use of existing procedures, judges
should consider each individual procedure and employ those that
will be helpful. Rule 16(c)(10) states that the conference partici-
pants may consider "the need for adopting special procedures for
managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may in-
volve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or
unusual proof problems." 153 The clause explicitly authorizes and
encourages the use of pretrial procedures and other judicial tools
to deal with difficult cases.154
During the pretrial conference, the judge should use any devices
that will improve the ability of a lay factfinder to understand the
case. The increased use of the various procedural tools will permit
courts to evaluate the procedures' effectiveness in different situa-
tions. Understanding the effectiveness of various tools will clarify
the need for further refinements or completely new procedures.
Special Masters
The pretrial conference gives the court a preview of the case and
and any unrepresented parties, by a scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or
other suitable means, enter a scheduling order that limits the time
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(2) to file and hear motions; and
(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order also may include
(4) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial con-
ference, and trial; and
(5) any other matter appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more than 120 days
after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be modified except by leave
of the judge or a magistrate when authorized by district court rule upon a
showing of a good cause.
Fan. R. Civ. P. 16(b), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 168-69 (1983).
153. FAn. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(10).
154. FED. R. Cirv. P. 16 advisory committee note.
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a chance to identify problems before trial. Thus, if the judge dis-
covers a scientific evidence problem during the pretrial conference,
he has an opportunity to resolve the problem at an early stage.
Appointment of a special master in a case involving a great deal of
scientific and technological evidence might be appropriate and
helpful.15 5 Rule 16(c)(6) authorizes the appointment of a master
during the pretrial conference. 158 The term "master" could include
scientific examiners.1 57 Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure specifies the procedure for appointing masters.1 58 Courts
could use masters with a scientific background to reduce uncer-
tainty and confusion surrounding technological and scientific evi-
dence. The master's findings could be admitted into evidence159
and could reduce confusion because the factfinder could rely on
the master's independent, impartial findings, rather than weighing
competing evidence presented by the litigants' hired experts.
Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
"[a] reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.
In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated." 8 0 Despite this limitation, the
growth in complicated scientific disputes demands using compe-
tent scientific masters to sort out technical evidence and present
findings in an understandable fashion.
In a nonjury trial, the master essentially would become the
factfinder.'6 ' The judge would accept the master's findings of fact
155. See FED. R. Crv. P. 53.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6).
157. Leventhal, supra note 119, at 549.
158. Rule 53 provides:
(a) APPoiNrmENT AND COMPENSATION. The court in which any action is pend-
ing may appoint a special master therein. As used in these rules the word
"master" includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, and an assessor...
(b) RMEFRENCE. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the
rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
159. See infra note 164.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
161. Rule 53(e)(2) provides:
(2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury the court
shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Within 10
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unless they were clearly erroneous.162 The parties, nevertheless,
could contest the master's report, and the judge could hear argu-
ments and modify the master's report if necessary.163 In jury trials,
the master's report is admissible as evidence and is subject to the
court's ruling on any objections to the report.'" The jury remains
the ultimate finder of fact, however, and can reject the master's
report. "5 The use of masters to reduce problems presented by sci-
entific evidence safeguards the traditional values of the jury sys-
tem. The litigants participate in the master's proceedings just as
they do in regular court proceedings. Increased use of special sci-
ence masters would enable courts to learn which cases are handled
best by masters.
Advisory Juries
An alternative to using special masters in nonjury trials is the
appointment of an advisory jury."' Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that "[iun all actions not triable of
right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may
try any issue with an advisory jury. 1 67 If a case involved complex
scientific evidence, an advisory jury could consist of scientists from
the appropriate field or from a related field.1 68 These juries would
days after being served with notice of the filing of the report any party may
serve written objections thereto upon the other parties. Application to the
court for action upon the report and upon objections thereto shall be by mo-
tion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The court after hearing may
adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may
receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 53(e)(2).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Rule 53(e)(3) provides:
(3) In Jury Actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall not
be directed to report the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to
him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be read to the
jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections in point of law
which may be made to the report.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3).
165. Id.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
167. Id.
168. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MiuLaR, 9 FEDERAL PRAcICE AND PROCEDURE § 2335
(1971).
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become "assistant triers of fact" and would aid the judge in under-
standing complicated evidence.16 9 By relying on an advisory jury,
the judge could gain a fuller understanding of the evidence. In-
creased use of this tool would promote efficiency, competency, fair-
ness, and confidence in the legal system. If the use of advisory ju-
ries gained the trust and confidence of all participants in the legal
system, the use of these juries would increase. Using advisory ju-
ries would allow judges to deal more competently with complex sci-
entific and technological issues.
Court-appointed Experts
A judge might choose to call a court-appointed expert witness to
eliminate confusion created by the use of scientific evidence.170
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes using court-
appointed experts.1 1  Courts can appoint experts if expert testi-
mony will help the trier of fact evaluate the evidence. 172 A court
should appoint experts if the court believes that the parties' ex-
perts have not presented a complete picture or have confused the
factfinder.
Court-appointed experts assist lay factfinders because the ex-
perts are an additional source of evidence that may reduce uncer-
tainty. Moreover, court-appointed experts usually have more credi-
169. Id. Advisory juries could perform many of the proposed functions of the Science
Court. See supra notes 73-116 and accompanying text.
170. FED. R. Evw. 706(a).
171. Rule 706 provides in part:
(a) Appointment.-The court may on its own motion or on the motion of
any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint ex-
pert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by
the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed
of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the
clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to partici-
pate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his
deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the
court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party,
including a party calling him as a witness.
FED. R. Evro. 706(a). Rule 706(b) provides for compensation for the court appointed expert.
The trial court has discretion to divide the expert's fee between the parties. FED. R. Evm.
706(b).
172. See FED. R. Evm. 702.
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bility than partisan experts. 73 Partisan experts often are unsure
whether they owe allegiance to the court or to the party who hired
them.17 4 Court-appointed experts do not suffer from any role con-
fusion because they owe allegiance to the court. Using court-ap-
pointed experts, therefore, can help resolve disputed points be-
tween the parties or the partisan experts.
CONCLUSION
Greater use of scientific evidence in the courtroom threatens the
ability of judges and jurors to comprehend the evidence. Neverthe-
less, scientific evidence should be welcomed because it often
reduces uncertainty, thereby improving the decisionmaking pro-
cess. If scientific evidence is to remain a factor that affects the
decisionmaking process, the evidence must be made understanda-
ble within the existing judicial structure.
Thoughtful solutions to the problems of scientific evidence often
treat only part of the problem, or threaten the impartial and ad-
versarial nature of our judicial system. Greater use of existing judi-
cial procedures could eliminate confusion created by the use of sci-
entific evidence and would serve the important policies embodied
in the Anglo-American judicial system. This approach would pre-
serve impartiality without disrupting the roles of the participants
in the existing legal system. Even if the court used a special
master, the jury would be the ultimate arbiter of disputed facts.
An advisory jury, whose members would be selected on the basis of
expertise and impartiality, would be appropriate only in nonjury
trials. Court-appointed experts, who owe their allegiance to the
court, may be used in bench or jury trials. The court should ap-
point only experts who do not have a personal or professional in-
terest in the outcome of the dispute to ensure their impartiality.
This approach also would preserve the adversary system. The
parties could participate in the master's proceedings and thereafter
could challenge the master's findings. If a court used an advisory
jury, the parties still would take the usual adversarial approach to
the trial. The ultimate finder of fact would be the trial judge, and
the advisory jury simply would help the judge understand the evi-
173. See FED. R. Evm. 706 advisory committee note.
174. See M. SAxs & R. VAN DUIZmmD, supra note 18, at 71-73.
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dence. If a court appointed experts of its own, the parties would
retain significant rights of cross-examination. Either party could
examine the court-appointed expert,17 5 or call his own expert
witnesses. 7 6
Pretrial conferences simplify and focus the issues and facilitate
the presentation of the case. Chief Judge Robert Pecham, com-
menting on his experience with pretrial conferences, stated that
using a pretrial conference improves the organization of trials and
makes them more comprehensible to the lay juror. 77 Increasing
the comprehension of lay jurors is a worthy goal of the judicial sys-
tem and, therefore, should be the primary goal of the pretrial con-
ference. The pretrial conference, as well as the other existing judi-
cial tools, hold great promise for increasing comprehensibility in
cases involving complex scientific issues, and their effective use will
lead to fairer, more just decisions.
JOHN W. WESLEY
175. FED. R. Evi). 706(a).
176. FED. R. Ev. 706(d).
177. See, Peckham, supra note 149, at 805.
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